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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine how accountability is practised by charity institutions in 
Nigeria.The paper employs Ebrahim‟s charity accountability framework to analyse BudgIT‟s 
website, public related documents and news. It is observed that the practice of accountability by 
BudgIT lays emphasis on upward accountability to donors, focused on primarily reporting basic 
descriptive financial and performance information. However the research is based on a content 
analysis of a single charity organisation and, therefore, any generalising of the conclusions 
beyond BudgIT may not represent the reporting behaviour of all charity institutions in 
Nigeria.This paper is among the few studies that investigate the reporting behaviour of charitable 
institutions in a developing country, thus contributing to the scanty literature on charitable 
accountability in Nigeria. 
JEL: D90, M40.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, charity organisations have experienced tremendous growth due to 
several factors among which are being significant players in the social welfare development of 
the disadvantaged and an active catalyst for social change (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; Connolly, 
2012; Dhanani & Connolly, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Edun, 2000; Goddard & Assad, 2006; 
Hooper et al., 2007). Nonetheless, public confidence and trust in these institutions have eroded in 
recent times due tore-occurrences of scandals, misappropriation of resources, bad governance, 
organisational inefficiency and even terrorist financing (Ebrahim, 2003b; Dellaportas et al., 
2012; Dunne, 2013; O‟Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; Yasmin et al., 2014), hence raising the need 
for greater public scrutiny of the sector (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013; Dellaportas, Langton, & 
West, 2012; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008). 
A wide spectrum of studieshas been carried out globally to determine the accountability 
of the charity sector empirically. However, in sub-Sahara Africa, specifically Nigeria, academic 
research on the accountability of the third sector is under-explored. Hence this paper fills this 
lacuna in the literature.While there are several accountability aspects to study in the Nigerian 
charity sector, this paper evaluates the reporting behaviour of the charity organisation, BudgIT. 
BudgIT is a civic organisationselected as the case studybecause its mandate isto promote 
transparency and accountability in governments by enlightening Nigerians onfiscal information. 
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Consequently, accountability, which is the core philosophy of BudgIT, is assumed to 
simultaneously reflect in their scope of work. Yet no published study has revealed what type of 
accountability behaviour is practised in BudgIT. This paper endeavours to rectify this oversight. 
To achieve the study objective, the accountability mechanism developed by Ebrahim 
(2003a, 2003b, 2010) will be employed to examine the communicated accountability of BudgIT. 
The primary key motivation for conducting this study is the lack of published accountability 
literature on the charity sector in Nigeria despite the growing economic influence of the sector in 
the country (Odumosu, Olaniyi, & Alonge, 2009). The format of the remaining paper is arranged 
as follows. The paper reviews prior literature on the reporting behaviour of charitable 
institutions. Thisis followed by detailing the research methodology used for the study. The next 
section examines and discusses the results of the analysis before drawing to conclusions in the 
final section. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definition of Charity 
Before discussing the issue at hand, a caveat must be put to record relating to the attempt 
to describe an entity as a charitable organisation. This is due to the fact that the literature contains 
numerous terminologies used to identify this sector. For example, terms like NGOs, Not-for-
profit Organisations (NFPOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Third sector and 
Philanthropic trust are found. Hence, defining what constitutes a charitable institution would help 
ensure the correct focus of the discussion. 
Charitable institutions are organisations set up not to profit the donors, but to further the 
social objectivesbehind the provision of goods and services for the benefit of marginalised 
communities (Andrews, 2014). Donors do not directly benefit from their donations. Rather, such 
contributions go to third parties which are the beneficiaries and the community at large (Collison 
et al., 2006; Connolly & Hyndman, 2013).From the abovedescription of charitable organisations, 
studies (see Dellaportas et al., 2012; Dhanani & Connolly, 2012; Hooper et al., 2007) have 
concluded that the charity sector is a subclass of NFPOs. According to Hooper et al. (2007), 
NFPOs are established with the sole aim to cater for the “disadvantaged members of the society” 
and not to pursue financial goals. This is the same mission of the charity sector. Interestingly, 
some literature also argued that NFPOs performed the same functions as NGOs and concluded 
that the term NFPOs could be used interchangeably (Andrews, 2014; Collison et al., 2006; 
Ebrahim, 2003, 2005).Similarly, Dellaportas et al. (2012) argued that the NFPOsare globally 
referred to as the „third sector‟. 
This trend is observable in articlesconcerning the Nigerian charity sector. They refer to 
the use of the charity organisation interchangeably with either CSOs, third sector, NGOs or 
NFPOs (Bradely, 2005; Davis, Jegede, Leurs, Sunmola, & Ukiwo, 2011; Essia & Yearoo, 2009; 
Fasakin, 2011; Ibeanu, 2009; Nwokoro, 2017). Thus, in this paper, the literature concerning the 
reporting practices of charitable institutions, NFP organisations, third sector, CSO and NGO is 
drawn upon to deliberate the problem at hand. 
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Charity and Accountability 
The characteristics of a typical charity organisation encompass a broad range of 
important stakeholders (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003b, 2004, 2005; Goddard & Assad, 2006; 
Yasmin et al., 2014), with the stakeholders having different levels of influence and demand on 
the charity institutions (Robert Lloyd, 2005). These stakeholders include but are not limited to 
the donors (individuals or corporate organisations) whose donations are the primary source of 
funds to charity institutions; the beneficiaries/clients or communitiesas the recipients of the 
services provided by the charity sector; the government/regulatory body which provides legal 
framework and performs the oversight functions;and the staff (directors and employees) and 
volunteers who operationalise the mission of the charitable institutions. At the end of the day, the 
charity institutions are expected to be accountable to these multiple partiesby reporting 
informationvia formal communication channels (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013;  Ebrahim, 2010; 
Lloyd, 2005), despite the multiple parties having diverse accountability demands (Dhanani & 
Connolly, 2012; Kaldor, 2003). 
Accordingly, the charity institutions are expected to disclose their financial position and 
performance, utilisation of resources, achievement, programmes, policies and procedures and 
structure of the organisation (Connolly & Hyndman, 2004; Yasmin et al., 2014). Arguably, to put 
in practice an equitable reporting and disclosure practice satisfying the above-stated actors is 
difficult (Ebrahim, 2010; O‟Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015). Either the reporting practice is oriented 
towards the conditions set by the donors, patrons and government, which is termed upward 
accountability or is somewhat accountable to the beneficiaries/clients, which is known as 
downward accountability or being accountable to the mission, staff, decision-makers and field 
implementers of NGOs. This is referred to as internal accountability (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 
2005, 2010). 
Upward accountability simply means the reporting practice to a set of stakeholders 
(donors, government and patrons) who have a significantinfluence on the access and utilisation 
of funds of the charity organisation (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003b; Lloyd, 2005). The primary 
purpose of this type of accountability is to meet the donors‟ need to understand how their 
donations were utilised (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010). Osman (2012) stated that this kind of 
accountability is similar to corporate accountability (accountability to shareholders), i.e. being 
accountable to the parties who provided the funds. It is also referred to as hierarchical or 
functional accountability as itfocuses on being accountable to powerful stakeholders, who to 
some extent can determine the progress of institutions (Ciaran Connolly & Hyndman, 2013; 
Brendan O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Unerman & O‟Dwyer, 2006). In a nutshell, accountability 
in an upward reporting personifies complying with accounting mechanisms set by the regulatory 
body and donors (Ebrahim, 2003b; Osman, 2012). Hence, such accountabilityis 
constantlycentred on the resource use (financial report), result and performance of institutions 
(progress report) (O‟Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015). 
The effect of upward reporting lies in the notion of trying to provide quick andgood 
result and performance of the „accountee‟(Baur & Schmitz, 2012).This, however, leads to 
anxiety and vulnerability on the part of the „accountor‟. Hence, the long-term strategic decisions 
of charity institutionsare shortchanged for immediate short-term results or short-term functional 
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accountability,which in the long run is counterproductive, unsustainable and detrimental to the 
overall objective of the charity sector(Andrews, 2014; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; O‟Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015; Osman, 2012).Such a dysfunctional effect of upward accountability via an 
emphasis on resource use and immediate impact/physical achievement was aptly pointed out by 
Jacobs & Wilford (2010: 4) that: 
“the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition‟s report described instances of houses built 
that local people would never live in, the result of NGOs focusing on completing 
activities without fully understanding local peoples‟ priorities”. 
On the other hand, downward accountability or bottom-up means reporting tothe 
stakeholders for whom the institutions wereprincipally established (Ebrahim, 2010). In the case 
of the third sector, such stakeholders include the beneficiaries and the communities indirectly 
affected by the organisation‟s activities (Ebrahim, 2005). This type of reporting practice, unlike 
the hierarchical, is not determined by the „accountees‟ as they lack the power to do so (Collison 
et al., 2006; Robert Lloyd, 2005). Rather, it emanates from the informal close relationship with 
the clients (Ahmad Zamri Osman, 2012). The inclusion of these „accountees‟ in the reporting 
mechanisms tends to help charitable organisations to get feedback in the form of corrections, 
advice and guidance in the discharge of their primary objective (Ebrahim, 2003a). The resulting 
effect would be the prioritisation of charity institution‟s programmes and projects so as to 
address the needs and aspirations of the intended beneficiaries (Brendan O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008).However, since such accountability emanates as a result of moral and ethical obligation, 
such informal contract offers a scope for choice to the „accountor‟ (Robert Lloyd, 2005). Thus, 
there is no standard format on how to be accountable to the downward parties which leads to 
variation in downward reporting among charitable institutions (Ebrahim, 2004). 
 
The Conflict between Upward and Downward Accountability 
Evidence from practiceshas shown that in trying to meet with therigorous standards set 
by the donors and regulators, there is a high tendency for the NGOs to neglect the downward 
stakeholder. Implicit in this discourse is several studies by Ebrahim (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 
2010) in which, among others, the author revealedthat NGOs‟ accountability in practice have 
upheld upward accountability and failed to develop accountability to the beneficiaries of the 
NGOs‟ services. Similarly, O‟Dwyer (2005) study on a foreign aid agency concluded that the 
NGO would uphold upward accountability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its donors. 
Furthermore, O‟Dwyer & Unerman (2008) investigated Irish Amnesty International in order to 
assess the development of accountability in specific NGO contexts. The result of the study 
corroborated the findings of previous studies. 
Even faith-based NGOs were found to be practising upward accountability. Yasmin et al. 
(2014) used the famous Stewart‟s (1984) “ladder of accountability” to determine accountability 
reporting practices of Muslim and Christian based charities in the UK. The study found that both 
faith-based organisations‟ accountability mechanismislimited to the disclosure of financial 
figures without incorporating performance achievement. This typically represents probity and 
compliance to a set of standards, indicatinghierarchical accountability (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; 
Alnoor Ebrahim, 2010). Also, the study by Andrews (2014) on 77 NGOs that participated in the 
Zapatista movement in Mexico found that 24 of the NGOs abandoned the Zapatista solidarity 
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because of the clash between the NGOs donors‟ demand for reporting and the Zapatista‟s 
demand to influence the NGOs‟ programmes. The study by Andrews (2014) thus illustrates how 
NGOs cannot sacrifice hierarchical accountability for downward accountability. 
In Africa, studies also point to the dominance of upward accountability practice by 
NGOs. The study by Burger & Seabe (2014) gave an overall summary of the NGOs‟ 
accountability in Africa. Their findings showed that even though there has been advocacy for 
new ways of instilling accountability between NGOs and community beneficiaries, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the dominant models of accountability have been successful in 
promoting downward accountability. 
More specifically in South Sudan, Beattie (2011), through interviews and focus group 
discussions with NGOs and community beneficiaries, examined NGOs‟ downward 
accountability and found that downward accountability cannot be practised within certain 
contexts due to inherent structural difficulties. Bawole & Langnel (2016) also examined NGOs‟ 
downward accountability in community project planning in Ghana. Employing the same research 
methodology of Beattie (2011) with NGOs, government officials and community members, the 
findings reveal that community members were engaged in project planning processes; however, 
these engagements were limited to endorsing pre-prepared plans, decisions, and 
insignificantaspects of the project. Hence, the authors concluded that downward accountability 
was found to be missing because the engagements were largely rhetorical and to gain legitimacy. 
The theory of resource dependence has been used to explain the dominance of upward 
reporting (Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2005; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). These studies suggest 
that when an organisation depends on another organisation for resources, the latter has more 
leverage to control the agenda. In the case of an NGO faced with various competing demands 
from stakeholders, “NGOs are likely to favour those who have the power to implement rewards 
and punishments” (Andrews, 2014 : 100). Apart from resource dependence, evidence also 
submits that such dominance could be due to other factors. For instance, a report by 
Ebrahim(2004) indicated that the mechanisms used by NGOs for downward accountability are 
poorly established. Also, Keystone (2006) pointed to the complexities and cost of resources as a 
major bottleneck of being accountable to beneficiaries. While the study by O‟Dwyer & Unerman 
(2007) highlighted that due to lack of resources, expertise and commitment, downward 
accountability could notbe practised. Furthermore,Baur & Schmitz (2012) argued that the factors 
undermining the struggle for downward accountability in NGOs are twofold, namely 
organisational survival & competition for donations and the increase in demand for more 
accountability on NGOs. Andrews (2014) also concurred with the findings of Baur and Schmitz, 
where he concluded that the monitoring and appraisal mechanisms put in place by the 
government and donors to ensure accountabilitymight neglect not only the downward 
stakeholders but also the core values of the NGOs. 
To summarise the argument, prior literatureconcluded that accountability to donors and 
government in the third sector is most prevalent due to several factors but principally because of 
dependence on resources and legal recognition. However, evidence from Nigeria is yet to be 
established on what type of reporting behaviour is being practised by the third sector. This 
research is carried out to fill this lacuna in the literature by carrying out a content analysis of 
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BudgIT‟s websites, publications and any related news. After describing the Nigerian charity 
sector in the next section, the research methodology is explained in detail. 
The Nigerian Charity Sector 
Although the statutory regulation in Nigeria did not explicitly define a charity 
organisation, the description of „Companies Limited by Guarantee‟ under the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (Republic of Nigeria, 1990) as amended covertly states what charity 
institutions entail. Section 26 (1) of CAMA states that: 
 “Where a company is to be formed for promoting commerce, art, science, 
religion, sports, culture, education, research, charity or other similar objects, and 
the income and property of the company are to be applied solely towards the 
promotion of its objects and no portion thereof is to be paid or transferred 
directly or indirectly to the members of the company except as permitted by this 
Act, the company shall not be registered as a company limited by shares, but may 
be registered as a company limited by guarantee”. 
CAMA further states that: 
“A company limited by Guarantee is one that is incorporated primarily to 
promote the objective of such a company with its shareholders barred from 
distributing its profits among its members, as dividend or otherwise. In practice, 
companies limited by guarantee are registered in Nigeria to undertake strictly 
charitable objectives. In the event of the dissolution or winding up of a company 
limited by guarantee, its assets, after the liquidation of its liabilities, cannot also 
be distributed to its shareholders; instead, such profits must be transferred to 
another charitable organisation with objective similar to that of the company that 
is been dissolved”. 
 
The above definition defines and regulates charity institutions in Nigeria. In Nigeria, 
quantitative data is difficult to come by, but there are indications that the third sector is among 
the fastest growing sectors in the country (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). According to Iheme (2001), 
there is no reliable, authentic register of charity organisations in the country because some 
charity organisation, even though big and vibrant, may not be registered with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC), an organ of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs. Studies have 
shown that as of 1987, there was only one (1) registered charity organisation in the country. 
However, currently, there are over a thousand registered charities (Davis et al., 2011; Essia & 
Yearoo, 2009; Fasakin, 2011; Nwokoro, 2017). 
Charity organisations are regulated by CAC in pursuant of CAMA. They are required by 
this legislative framework to submit annual returns each year to CAC (Section 370 & 690 
CAMA). With regards to accounting and accountability, no specific statutory provisions state the 
rules of external reporting. However, as an accounting practice, charity organisations report on 
the basis of fund accounting (Iheme, 2001). In 2011, to improve the quality and consistency of 
information in NFPOs‟ financial statement, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria 
issued the Statement of Accounting Standards 32 titled “Accounting by Not-for-profit 
organisations” (Asien, 2016). The financial statements of NFPOs according to the standard 
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should include the following statement; „accounting policies‟, „financial position‟, „activities‟, 
„changes in net asset‟, „cash flow‟ and „notes to the account‟. The essence of introducing this 
standard is not to only improve the quality and consistency of information in NFPOs financial 
statement, but also promote trust, confidence and enhance sector accountability (Asien, 2016). 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study employs content analysis via the accounting mechanism developed by 
Ebrahim (2003a, 2003b, 2010). The accounting mechanism was specifically adopted to assess 
the three aspects of reporting behaviour; how can BudgIT be accountable? To whom are BudgIT 
accountable? and for what purpose will they be accountable? (see summary in table 1.1). BudgIT 
is a civic organisation established in 2011 that applies information technology (e.g. infographics) 
to promote citizen awareness by providing authentic and reliable data on government budget 
preparation and implementation. The process of educatingis donebyeducating citizens with 
information on public finance and fiscal analysis so that citizens will use such information to 
demand transparency and accountabilityat all levels of government (BudgIT‟s annual report, 
2016). The reason for choosing this organisationis the philosophy in which BudgIT was 
established, namely accountability. However, no established evidence reveals the kind of 
accountability practised by the organisation to its stakeholders. Secondly, the website of BudgIT 
is functional and up to date. 
Due to the nature of BudgIT, i.e. advocacy for transparency in public finance, it can be 
categorised under theNGO typology because of the following reasons espoused by Ebrahim 
(2003b, 2010) : 
i. Their client/beneficiaries were not involved in creating BudgIT. 
ii. The client/beneficiaries are external actors and have less influence in 
determining the activities of BudgIT. 
iii. They have attracted other organisations by virtue of their mission; advocacy for 
accountability and transparency of public officials and elected policymakers. 
iv. The mechanism of accountability of BudgIT involves fact-finding, lobbying, 
litigation and demand for transparency and accountability of public finance. 
v. Their actions are considered legitimate in Nigeria because they represent a 
collective voice of the masses. 
 
Accountability Framework 
How Can Charity Institutions be Accountable? 
To explore the first aspect of reporting behaviour, that is,„how can they be accountable‟ 
or what available mechanisms can the charity entities utilise to be accountable to the demands of 
stakeholders, Ebrahim (2003a, 2010) suggested charitable institutions can use several ways for 
reportingsuch as „annual reports/disclosure‟, „evaluation/performance assessment‟, 
„participations‟, „self-regulation‟ and „adaptive learning‟. The use of each of these 
tools/processes determines either upward, downward or internal accountability. Firstly, 
accountability through „annual reports/disclosure‟ denotes upward accountability because they 
are regularly required by donors and regulatory bodies/government, must be prepared in 
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accordance withthe stipulation and their lack of disclosure attracts sanctions such as fines, 
withdrawal of funding and losing their non-profit tax-exempt status. The bulk of information in 
the annual reports/disclosure reports basic financial data with limited disclosure of the quality of 
work and no attention to clients of the NGO (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b). 
Secondly, reporting„evaluation and performance assessment‟ indicate multidimensional 
accountability (both upward, downward and internal) depending on the issues under evaluation, 
the parties involved in the evaluations and to whom the report of the evaluation and assessment 
finally go. But in most evidence, performance assessment depicts upward accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2005) because, in the end, results are emphasised,and funders and NGOs use such 
results for funding purpose (Ebrahim, 2010). For instance, donors may need performance 
assessment reports near the end of a project/programmes (activities/output)to know the extent of 
the implementation of the project/programmes (Ebrahim, 2005),e.g. how many housing units 
built or training programmes on sanitation, trees planted, etc. This report is short-term oriented 
and focuses on the immediatetangible result. It could be crucial to future funding (Ebrahim, 
2005), hence denoting upward accountability. 
Thirdly, „self-regulation‟ mechanism refers to in-house developed codes and standards 
by NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003b; Lloyd & Casas, 2006). They are self-policing voluntary standards 
and codes of conduct developed by NGOs on primarily internal governance, finance and 
organisational integrityto redeem confidence on NGOs due to public scandals and in some cases 
to prevent potential government regulation (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2010; Lloyd, 2005; Lloyd & 
Casas, 2006).This mechanismskews towards internal accountability and upward accountability. 
The latter accountability meaning to show donors of “good housekeeping” and avoid intrusive 
government regulation (Ebrahim, 2003b).  
„Participation‟ and „adaptive learning‟ are primarily indicators of downward 
accountability. For „participation‟, charitable entities show transparency, sincerity and try to 
learn from the beneficiaries by seeking their input on projects and programmes via public 
meetings, the involvement of client in project implementation, surveys, and formal dialogue 
(Osman, 2012). While „adaptive learning‟ connotes systematic critical reflection and encoding 
inferences by NGOs in order to actualise their mission. Such reflection provides the opportunity 
to discuss mistakes by staff, forums for sharing of information with beneficiaries, 
experimentation, debate and capacity building (Ebrahim, 2010). It is very effective as it is an 
informal one-on-one dialogue which provides the opportunity to understand the beneficiaries‟ 
concerns and needs (Osman, 2012). Adaptive learning generates knowledge and using such 
knowledge to influence organisational practices (Ebrahim, 2005). Hence, adaptive learning by 
default connotes both downward and internal accountability. 
 
To whom are Charity Institutions Accountable? 
To determine „to whom they are accountable, the utilisation of the „how‟ (Annual report, 
Evaluation report, Self-regulation, Participation and adaptive learning) mechanisms will 
primarily point to either upward or downward accountability. For instance, annual report and 
evaluation report mechanisms mainly symbolise upward accountability, while „self-regulation‟ 
denotes internal accountability and lastly „participation‟ and „adaptive learning‟ primarily 
signifies downward accountability. 
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For What Purpose is Charity Entities Accountable? 
The last aspect of reporting behaviour is „for what purposes‟ do charities provide their 
report to the public. According to Ebrahim (2010:8), the purposes (for what) of charitable 
institutions means “to be accountable for different things by different people”. Ebrahim (2010) 
submitted that charity organisations‟ reports are for four reasons; „finance‟, „performance‟, 
„governance‟ and „mission‟. The first type of purpose focuses on „finance‟ which translates to 
disclosure on financial transactions, conformity to accounting standards/reporting requirement 
and account for resource use by NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003a). Accountability in this context is strict, 
rigorous and enforced on NGOs, and if non-complied with, NGOs will be sanctioned with fines, 
imprisonment, withdrawal of finance, tarnishing of image or loss of tax-exempt status (Ebrahim, 
2003b, 2010). Thus, accountability for finance depicts upward accountability. 
Accountability for „performance‟ relates to the results of the programmes/projects of the 
charity organisations. This accountability measures the performance of charity organisations and 
links NGOs goals and objectives to immediate outcome/output (Ebrahim, 2005). As stated by 
(Ebrahim, 2005, 2010), such accountability is primarily encouraged by donors and the stress on 
short-term results portray such a purpose as hierarchical accountability. Being accountable for 
„governance‟ focuses on the role of the charity‟s board of directors. The fiduciary duties of the 
board of directors centres on serving the mission of the NGOs, financial oversight (how the 
institution raises and spend money), follows donor intent and to ensure compliance to legal and 
regulatory laws. Again, this kind of accountability shows conformity to the demands of 
stakeholders who fund and regulate the charitable sector. 
The last type of expectation centres on the charitable organisation‟s „mission‟. What 
charity organisations are required to do in this aspect is to report and demonstrate the progress of 
their programmes and projects towards achieving the sole aim of their creation. As stated earlier, 
NGOs are accountable to not only upward, downward parties but also internally to their 
missions, boards and staff (Ebrahim, 2004, 2005, 2010). Hence reporting of mission embraces 
monitoring results or outcomes by NGOs against their sole existence. Ebrahim asserts that “the 
mission statement for NGOs provide a focal point around which to develop internal 
accountability” (Ebrahim, 2003b: 9), thus depicting internal accountability. However, donors 
study the missions in selecting which NGOs to fund. Thus, reporting this „what‟ of accountability 
may depict both internal and upward accountability, but the former is the primary target. 
 
Data Source 
For the data source for the content analysis, the website, annual reports (2013-2017), voluntary 
publications and any related news of BudgIT will be examined. 
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Table 1. The Accounting Mechanism 
Adapted from: Ebrahim (2003a, 2003b, 2010) 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
In terms of the format of this section, the content analysis of BudgIT‟s websites, latest 
annual report, publications and any related news is presented under the following sections: 
accountability how; accountable to whom; and accountability for what purpose. 
How Can Budget be Accountable? 
As an advocacy organisation of fiscal transparency, content analysis of BudgIT‟s 
websites and relevant news are mostly data on budget information and fiscal analysis of Federal 
and State Governments, Ministries, Department and Agencies. The timeframe of information on 
budget and fiscal analysis available for download from BudgIT‟s website went as far back as 
1999 even though the company was established in 2011. Published documents that can be found 
in the website includeannual reports, performance evaluation reports, public finance documents 
(budgets), fiscal analysis and surveys. 
Firstly, their annual reports from 2013 to 2017 (the latest) are publicly available for 
download from the website. This finding is expected as there is a law that mandates registered 
NGO 
Type 
Orientation Accountability 
how? 
(Tools or process) 
Accountability to whom? 
(upward, downward, 
internal) 
Accountability for what? 
(finance, performance, 
governance, mission) 
N
et
w
o
rk
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
 
 Is
su
e 
b
as
ed
 p
o
li
cy
 c
h
an
g
e
 
Disclosures/report 
(tool) 
 Primarily to 
funders and 
oversight 
agencies 
 Finance and 
performance 
depending on what is 
being reported 
Evaluation and 
performance 
assessment (tool) 
 Primarily to 
funders 
 Performance often 
short-term output but 
with increasing 
emphasis on impact 
Self-regulation 
(tool & process) 
 To non-profits 
themselves as a 
sector 
 To donors as a 
seal of good 
housekeeping 
 Finance and 
governance 
depending on what 
the codes or standard 
emphasise 
Participation 
(process) 
 Primarily 
downwards from 
non-profits to 
clients and 
communities 
 Internally to non-
profits 
themselves 
 Depends on the 
purpose of 
participation e.g. 
whether to seek input 
on implementation 
(performance) or to 
influence agendas 
Adaptive learning 
(process) 
 To non-profits 
themselves 
 Downwards and 
upwards to 
stakeholders 
 Mission and 
performance 
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charity organisations in Nigeria to submit annual returns each year (see Section 370 & 690 of 
CAMA). Another interpretation is that the publication of the five (5) year‟s annual reports 
suggests that BudgIT recognised the annual report as a crucial document in their discharge of 
accountability. This conclusion is consistent with existing studies that the annual report has 
become the most used tool for reporting by charity organisations (Connolly & Hyndman, 2004, 
2013;  Dellaportas, Langton, & West, 2012; Dhanani & Connolly, 2012). The average number of 
pages of the annual reports (2013-2017) is 30 pages and on averaged comprised a higher page 
count of narrative disclosures on programmes and projects being executed by BudgIT as 
compared with financial information. For instance, the 2016 and 2017 annual report with 34 and 
42 pages respectively, have only three pages of financial information. This suggests that BudgIT 
recognised the need for non-financial information in discharging their accountability and have 
understood that financial information is likely more difficult to understand by stakeholders. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Connolly & Hyndman (2013) and (Dhanani & Connolly 
(2012) where non-financial information dominated the annual reports. 
Similarly, the content of the non-financial information of the annual reports were usually 
structured under themes such as „Lead partner‟s/Trustee‟s report‟‟ „budget access‟, „tracking 
government projects‟, „partnership/workshops/engagement with stakeholders‟, „fiscal data 
analysis and presentations‟ and „campaign on national needs‟. The reporting of the programmes 
and projects in the annual reports contained colourful visualisation features in the form of 
pictures, info-graphs and chain analysis. The colourful pictures generally comprised of images of 
BudgIT‟s stakeholders such as the employees/volunteers, donors, beneficiaries/communities, 
NGOs and government officials. 
 Performance evaluation reports of BudgIT were reported via a document called „impact‟ 
report. The report reveals the performance of programmes and projects implemented by BudgIT 
and the overall impact felt by the communities/beneficiaries/clients. Visual colourful images and 
statistical info-graphs of beneficiaries/communities were also used as a medium to report on the 
programmes and projects in the „impact‟ report. Most information disclosed in the „impact‟ 
report only reported performance information on input (e.g. staff, money and data) and output 
(e.g. number of citizens having access to fiscal data) without reporting the results (e.g. public 
officials became prudent and transparent) of programmes and projects, while little information 
reported all three (3) performance information. In the case of the former, for instance, BudgIT‟s 
project on “Visualising education budget for citizen engagement and institutional action”, the 
following „impact‟ report was stated: 
 “Within two months of rollout, citizens had access to at least 40 viral 
infographics on the state of education and accompanying interactive solutions, 
which enabled them understand that data is essential to initiating and sustaining 
robust discussions on the performance of education budgets. BudgIT reached 
over 600,000 citizens, who are now raising their voices and asking pertinent 
questions” (Impact report, 2016). 
While in the case of the latter, the following „impact‟ report was disclosed on the project “Fix our 
oil” campaign which translates to a call for more disclosure of Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation‟s (NNPC) operations in the country: 
44  Musawa 
 
 “The Fix Our Oil campaign has been tremendous in terms of reach; BudgIT has 
been able to engage the heads of the NNPC in a series of presentations, as well as 
with the head of NEITI, Mr. Waziri Adio. The most recent results of these efforts 
being the joint publication of “One Year of NNPC Reports,” with BudgIT on its 
part reaching at least 400, 000 people within its offline and online communities” 
(Impact report, 2017). 
From the 2016 „impact‟ report, it could be seen that only the input (“Within two months 
of rollout”) and output (“citizen had access to 40 viral infographics and BudgIT reached over 
600,000 citizens”) of the project were reported without reporting the results (for instance, 
transparency and performance of education budgets has increased due to citizens asking 
questions). However, the 2017 „impact‟ report did not only disclose the input and output 
(“engage the heads of NNPC and NEITI”), but also the result (joint publication of “One Year of 
NNPC Reports”) of the “fix our oil” projects. The 2016 performance report fell short of the 
information needs for stakeholders especially donors because the study by Connolly & Hyndman 
(2013) revealed that donors emphasise all performance (input, output and result) information. 
Another important published document is the „Tracka‟ report. „Tracka‟ is a medium 
created by BudgIT in 2014 to give the Nigerian masses the opportunity to track and report the 
level of implementation of public infrastructure which at the end of a period is compiled into a 
report to reveal the level of ongoing construction of infrastructures financed by 
governments‟budget. Visual colourful images of communities, volunteers, infrastructures and 
beneficiaries are also used for presentational purpose in the „Tracka‟ reports. 
Other published documents are related to public finance analysis and surveys in the form 
of info-graphs and other technology-driven statistics. The public finance analysis reports (e.g. 
Federal, States and MDAs‟ budget, budgetperformance of Federal, States and MDAs „Ebola 
Health Fund Watch‟ etc.) and surveys (EBOLA Primary Health Care System Survey,). Unlike 
the annual reports, these published documents are variable in length, lack common themes and 
inclusive of financial and qualitative information. However, like the annual and impact reports, 
colourful visual presentations were used in the form of pictures of donors, clients, employees, 
infrastructure and communities. 
 Overall, all the information/published documents disclosed point to upward reporting. 
For instance, the published annual reports primarily reveal how donors‟ funds were utilised for 
the advocacy projects. While most performance evaluation reports disclosed via the „impact‟ 
reports disclosed only the performance of the projects with an emphasis on short-term impact. 
Emphasis on immediate tangible result according to Ebrahim (2003a, 2005) and Jacobs & 
Wilford (2010) means reporting of the immediate impact of projects by disclosing the input and 
output of projects. Most of the performance information published by BudgIT via the „impact‟ 
report disclosed only the input and output of programmes and projects thereby denoting upward 
accountability. Although the Tracka project reported via the Tracka report has the characteristics 
of „participation‟ mechanism which suggests downward reporting, a closer examination of the 
project reveals otherwise because in reality the Nigerian masses/beneficiaries are only actors who 
are being directed by BudgIT to report public finances. The Nigerian masses/beneficiaries do not 
have a role or input in the structure and how the „Tracka‟ project should be executed thereby 
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indicating upward accountability. In a nutshell, BudgIT‟s practices upward accountability to 
individual donors and policy advocacy networks with whom they share the same cause. 
Accountable to Whom 
To determine „to whom they are accountable‟, the utilisation of the „how‟ („annual 
report‟, „evaluation report‟, „self-regulation‟, „participation‟ and „adaptive learning‟) mechanisms 
will primarily point to either upward, downward or internal accountability. In the case of 
BudgIT, annual, „Impact‟ (performance) and „Tracka‟ reports symbolise upward accountability. 
Other documents and information in their website report only the advocacy issues they stand for 
which is transparency and accountability in budget preparation and implementation. 
Accordingly, BudgIT‟s „accountability to whom‟ behaviour represents hierarchical reporting. 
Accountable For What Purpose 
For this analysis, that is „for what purposes‟ BudgIT disclose their information, the 
information disclosed by BudgIT‟s annual reports (2013-2017) and other information in the 
website can be categorised into the following themes: 
1. Mission, objectives and activities 
2.  Achievements and performance 
3. Financial review 
4. Plans for the future 
5. Structure, governance and management 
6. Reference and administrative details. 
Disclosure of theme 1 (Mission, objectives and activities) by BudgIT depicts why the 
organisation was established and what it intends to achieve. The purpose of disclosure of this 
information is to report and demonstrate the progress of their programmes and projects towards 
achieving the sole aim of their creation. Such information as stated by  Ebrahim (2003b, 2004, 
2005, 2010) is accountability for „mission‟ and reporting of „mission‟ embraces monitoring 
results or outcomes by BudgIT themselves against their sole existence, thus depicting internal 
accountability. However, donors study the missions in selecting which NGOs to fund. 
Consequently, reporting this „what‟ of accountability by BudgIT depicts both internal and 
upward accountability. 
Reporting of theme 2 (Achievements and performance) can be grouped under the 
purpose of „performance‟ because it is related to results of the programmes/projects of BudgIT. 
BudgIT reported this theme as it tries to link its goals and objectives to immediate 
outcome/output of their activities. This kind of accountability as argued by Ebrahim (2003a) is 
principally encouraged by donors and the stress on short-term results depicts such purpose as 
upward accountability. The purpose of reporting theme 3 (financial review) which is only 
available in the annual reports, translates to disclosure on financial transactions and account for 
resource use by BudgIT. The reporting of such information is a must as stated by Ebrahim (2010) 
and if non-complied with, donors and partners of BudgIT might withdraw their donations and 
even lose their tax-exempt status (Osman, 2012). Hence, the reporting of such information 
connotes hierarchical accountability. 
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Finally, the reporting of themes 4 (plans for the future), 5 (structure, governance and 
management) and 6 (reference and administrative details) focused on being accountable for 
„governance‟. The purpose of reporting these themes by BudgIT is to show the structure and 
fiduciary role of the board of directors and staffs in achieving their missions (Ebrahim, 2003a, 
2003b, 2010). Conclusively, the analysis of these themes signifies a strong adherence to 
hierarchical reporting. Overall, the purpose of reporting by BudgIT is mostly to satisfy their 
donors‟ information needs and abide by regulations with little consideration to their employees 
and volunteers. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Nigerian charity sector plays a major role in social welfare development and activist 
for social change and accountability is viewed as a very important factor for the prosperity and 
confidence in the sector. The main objective of this study is to examine the reporting behaviour 
of charitable organisations in Nigeria. The motivation for carrying out the study lies in 
determining to whomcharitable organisations are accountable. Previous studies have revealed 
charitable organisations are accountable to stakeholders who provide funds and regulate 
charitable organisations. However, empirical evidence from Nigeria is lacking, thus the need for 
this research. 
In achieving the objective of the paper, the famous NGO accountability mechanism 
developed by  Ebrahim (2003a, 2003b, 2010) was employed to examine BudgIT‟s websites, 
publications and any related news. The results from the analysis of data showed the reporting 
behaviour of BudgIT is oriented towards upward accountability even though it was found that 
internal accountability was insignificantly practised via reporting of their mission and objectives. 
The findings have corroborated the ten-year study by Edun on NGO‟s projects in Nigeria that 
“most projects can be said to have been based on donor-identified needs', rather than on a process 
of dialogue with the intended beneficiaries and other community stakeholders” (Edun, 2000:48) 
which underscores the likelihood of upward accountability to donors. Similarly, the findings do 
not differ from previous studies which found that the accountability of charitable organisations is 
skewed towards donors and regulators. On a practical level, the most likely reason for practising 
upward accounting by BudgIT might be attributed to formal external reporting laws by donors 
and regulators. 
Drawing on Edun (2000) and Ebrahim (2003b, 2005), more attention needs to be given to 
charitable adaptive learning and participation from beneficiaries so that BudgIT will not continue 
to spend significant resources which will have little or no impact on the intended beneficiaries or 
advocating for causes that might not be patronised because they do not reflect the real needs of 
the beneficiaries. The significant contribution of this study is addressing the scarcity of existing 
literature on accounting and accountability of charitable organisations in Nigeria. To the best 
knowledge of the researcher, the only known study on accountability of charitable organisation 
in Nigeria is the study by Edun (2000). By providing evidence on the reporting behaviour of 
BudgIT in Nigeria, the present study makes a noteworthy contribution to the literature, 
considering that previous studies have focused on countries, mostly in Europe, the United States 
of America and Asia. Evidence from a developing African country is lacking. Additionally, 
unlike most previous studies which tend to focus on the „service delivery‟ of NGOs as their case 
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studies, this study reports the unique accountability behaviour of a „network issue-based 
organisation‟ (Ebrahim, 2003b). 
Inevitably, there are several limitations to the study. First, only a single charitable 
organisation was examined. Hence, the findings cannot be generalised to other charitable 
institutions. In addition, the method of data collection employed in this study has inherent 
shortcomings. Using content analysissomewhat depends on the decision and interpretation of the 
researcherto determine the reporting behaviour of BudgIT introduces the possibility of subjective 
interpretation.Having identified the limitations encountered in the study, future research can 
contribute in several ways to the accounting and accountability of NGOs in Nigeria. First, future 
studies should study other charitable organisations in the country to determine their reporting 
behaviour. Similarly, researchers could employ other methods of data collection such as 
interviews which might provide an in-depth, comprehensive response on the reporting behaviour 
of charitable organisations in the country.Future research could also explore the accountability of 
the charity sector after the passage of the proposed „NGOs‟ Regulation and Coordination bill 
2015‟ to see if such new statutory provisions will enhance sector accountability to all 
stakeholders. 
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